SECRET
DESKBY
concern
Fifth Round of talks before deciding whether to intervene
personally and propose a meeting in Peking. In addition to the
points made in Bucharest TUR, we share Sir R McLaren's that a conditional offer of a visit by the Secretary of State to Peking would not in practice give us much Leverage with the Chinese. If Qian turned down the offer, this could weaken the
currency of messages from the Secretary of State. If he were to
accept we think there is
·
a strong chance that the Chinese would not in fact change their tactics in the talks. We would then be faced with the difficult choice between agreeing that the Secretary of State s visit should go ahead in circumstances where a successful outcome could not be assured and where the Chinese could succeed in enmeshing him in detailed negotiations: or withdrawing the offer which could make it more difficult to bring Foreign Ministers to bear on the talks when they reached a crucial stage.
4. We therefore believe that we should use the time before the Fifth Round to send a private message to the Chinese side. This would aim to reinforce the points we have put across in the Last round and include some concrete suggestions about how to take work forward. We propose the following elements:
We are
concerned that the talks have not yet begun to narrow the gap in substance between the two sides.
We are keen to move on to serious negotiation aimed at
settlement.
reaching a mutually acceptable
But in order to make that possible, it is essential that the Chinese side let us have their views on all the main issues including the through train and the other three points of interest to the British side.