SECOND REPORT.
HONG KONG
The Committee has agreed to the following Report:
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent Events in China
1.1 We prepare this report in the shadow of the recent terrible events in Beijing. The actions of the Central People's Government (CPG) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have appalled and shocked the world. During our own visit to Beijing at the end of April, only five weeks before the horrors of Tiananmen Square, we sought to establish whether the student demonstrations were indicative of a growing political crisis. We were told several times that they were not. The Cultural Revolution was described as an aberration; and we were assured that nothing like it could ever happen again. Yet, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army did not fire upon peaceful and unarmed demonstrators as they have done now in the streets of Beijing. It was also emphasised to us that the People's Republic was deeply committed to the continuing prosperity and stability of Hong Kong under the terms of the Joint Declaration. Hong Kong was to be both, as it were, a locomotive for the developing economy of south China, especially the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, and also an example which it was hoped Taiwan might follow in the future. It is difficult to conceive of any action, short of direct aggression against Hong Kong, that could have so shaken Hong Kong's confidence in the good intentions of the People's Republic.
1.2. All work on the Basic Law, both by the Drafting Committee and the Consultative Committee, has been suspended. Neither can the work of the British Government on the implementation of the Joint Declaration, for example in the Joint Liaison Group (JLG),2 continue as before. The meeting arranged for July in London has been postponed. The situation has changed so completely that positions have to be, and are being, fundamentally reassessed. Nonetheless, for the United Kingdom, there will be a need to re-establish talks with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in due course, for the reasons set out in paragraph 4.25 below. The fact remains that the PRC will be driven, in its own long term interests, to do all it can to maintain a prosperous and stable Hong Kong.
The Inquiry
1.3 We decided to undertake our inquiry at the beginning of the year. Our visit to Hong Kong in April' and the evidence which we took there left us in no doubt that serious problems did then exist, which had the potential of seriously jeopardising the aims of the Joint Declaration and of British policy. The Committee's visit provided the occasion for many people in Hong Kong to give vent to the very deep feelings, sometimes reflecting considerable bitterness, about the progress of events and about British policy as they saw it.
1.4. We took formal evidence, in public, at Westminster and in Hong Kong, from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Minister of State at the Home Office, the Governor of Hong Kong and senior officials of the Hong Kong Government, members of OMELCO," and others. We are extremely grateful to all those who gave evidence. A full list of witnesses is printed on page xliii and their evidence, which has also appeared in daily parts is produced in Volume II. We have also received many written submissions, for which we wish to express our thanks. Some are listed on pages xlv and xlvii and printed in Volume II, others are available in the House of Commons library and the Record Office of the House of Lords.
1.5. When we considered the future of our inquiry in the light of the bloody events in Beijing, we concluded that, although much has changed, and many things which were said then could not be said now, the underlying development has been that the concerns, which we identified during our visit, remained the same but had been intensified and required addressing even more urgently.
'See paragraph 3.18.
* See paragraph 4.27.
'Q 951.
◄ Eight members of the Committee visited Hong Kong from 17 to 22 April, and Beijing from 22-25 April.
* Office of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils.