HONU POLPEN
CONFIDENTIAL
CRC's attitude
3.
She said she did not know what the CRC would do in the event of legislation being introduced to LegCo after the Easter recess. It might be difficult to justify refusing to discuss the legislation. But once the legislation was in the Chamber, the consequences were very unpredictable. It did not necessarily follow that the proposals would be modified or diluted in the way which many people assumed. What if the pro-China legislators boycotted the whole process? what if Legco members were unable to agree on alternative proposals? There were so many variations and so many personal rivalries in the Chamber it was not a foregone conclusion that a consensus could be reached. If the Covernor's proposals went through more or less unamended, the consequences would be very grave. It could mean the end of cooperation across the board with China. CRC would need to weigh up all these factors in deciding how to react to the introduction of the legislation into the chamber.
Airport
4.
On the airport, she doubted that CRC could be persuaded to support the HKG's funding proposals unless and until the Government spelled out clearly what its contingency plans were in the event of no agreement with the Chinese. It was a pity if people assumed that they were taking this line "under orders" from China. The reality was that they were reflecting the concerns of large numbers of Hong Kong people. Did the HKG have anything to hide? Was it possible that they did not have a contingency plan? If they did, did not the principle of accountability require them to reveal it?
5.
We talked a bit about the airport platform. Selina claimed that in the December vote the CRC had intended first to vote for the platform, while reserving their position on future funding. But in the event there had been a muddle and they were unable to make their position clear.
6.
I pointed out that CRC had been in favour of the airport platform going ahead in June. Their switch of position reflected badly on them. Selina said that the question of the airport platform was a very sore point for Allen Lee. In June 1992 he had taken a message to the Chinese leadership, at the behest of the Chief Secretary, seeking their agreement to the HKG proceeding with the airport platform contract in advance of overall agreement on the rest of the package. The Chinese had responded favourably to this idea. He had therefore been very much taken aback when the Governor and ExCo had subsequently decided against such an approach in July. He had been furious, but had not spoken out, because he felt bound by the
confidentiality of his understanding with the CS. However he had felt badly let down.
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CONFIDENTIAL