satisfied and Hong Kong steeled in struggle. Others will
reply that the experience was a costly and unnecessary
lesson in reality; that there can be little honour in Sino-
British battles at Hong Kong's expense; and that the same or
better results could have been secured more rapidly and at
much less cost by quiet discussion in the autumn of 1992.
Most of these assertions and counter-assertions will be
unprovable. The wise observer will shrug his shoulders at
the theatre of self-justification and rejoice only at the
fact of agreement.
Serious and urgent though these matters now are,
set in a wider perspective they may come to be seen as less
alarming. There are still some scenes to be played out in
the Hong Kong drama and we may be sure that they will have
their share of tension. But these last fifteen years, since
the issue of the lease was raised, indirectly and with some
trepidation, during Sir Murray MacLehose's visit to
Peking, have been the most active and productive of the
hundred and fifty in which we have dealt with China over the
colony. Despite many slips on the way, they have seen a
significant advance in mutual understanding and restraint.
In the early years of our contact there was only
incomprehension and imposition. At first, in the
nineteenth century, it was Britain that dictated and China
that reacted or acquiesced. In the years after "liberation"
it was Britain that reacted, as during the Cultural
Revolution. But, until 1979, a constructive dialogue was
wanting.
Given the background and the vastly differing
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