legislation.
In a wider sense also, the agreement to open talks
between London and Peking was a watershed in the crisis. For
some six months there had been a
Sino-British
dealings over
new approach and style in
Hong Kong, an apparent
readiness to go it alone and embark on direct trials of
strength. In practice it had proved, to put it mildly,
counter-productive. Far from establishing an alternative
policy, the experience had become a demonstration that,
confrontation apart, there was no alternative: Britain and
China were condemned to cooperate over Hong Kong. Though
there was a natural reluctance to admit it, the two
governments were now back on the traditional course of
negotiation between capitals, as practised by the
mandarins and Sinologues of the previous decade.
The negotiations would of course be tough. The
subject was highly charged and significant damage had been
done. Chinese suspicions had been reinforced and their
hostile analysis of British policy seemingly vindicated.
Hong Kong society had been polarised and political
intrusion from the mainland accelerated. The terms that
might have been secured in quiet discussions in October
would be much harder to obtain after six months of trench
warfare. But at least there was a return to rational
discussion.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the
talks. At the time of writing (September 1993) they have not
made great progress. The Chinese will no doubt press for
proofs of British "sincerity", a return to pre-Patten