decide his policies. He was recorded as speaking at an
inaugural press conference, not just about Hong Kong 's
stability and prosperity, hallowed words from the 1982
communiqué, but also about Hong Kong's freedom.
What lay
behind the extra word? On a farewell visit to Peking in May I
was repeatedly asked to explain. I told the Chinese leaders
that the references were, of course, to the many rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Joint Declaration. They should
not disturb themselves. They were dealing with a strong,
well-disposed British Government, enjoying a new mandate
from the electorate, and with a Governor in Hong Kong who
was particularly well connected in London. This provided
the best possible basis for Sino- British cooperation over
Hong Kong. But we would like to see more cooperation from
China and less struggle.
Ominously, I found that I spent most of my time on
that visit, not in polite farewells, but in protracted
argument over the airport, which I had thought settled, at
least in broad outline, the previous Summer. The Chinese
were again proving difficult and demanding about the
financial arrangements, apparently trying to remove any
contingent liability on the S.A. R. Government and to assure
themselves of inheriting a first-class airport free of
charge in 1997. There were, of course, always going to be
problems of detail. But the larger issue lying behind them
now was Chinese uncertainty over the new Governor. Until
they could see the colour of his money they were not
prepared to give away any tricks over the airport. It was
again to be used as a lever for political ends.
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