а
issues; and, by reference to the Joint
Declaration,
rule
incorporated the assurance of continuing British
until 1997. Though the press made much of the references to
consultation, here and elsewhere in the memorandum,
treating them as British concessions
and Chinese
encroachments, they were sensible and harmless. For а
project of this size, involving work and expenditure long
after 1997, consultation with the successor government was
only natural and practical.
On contracts or franchises for the airport
straddling 1997, there was language whereby we would
provide the details for each application, the Chinese had a
month for consideration and then the decision lay with us.
The original phrase stating baldly that the ultimate
responsibility was ours was excised in the final form of
the memorandum out of regard for Chinese sensibilities, but
the meaning was clear nevertheless.
Finally the memorandum contained clauses on the
amount of Hong Kong government borrowing to be repaid after
1997 which could be undertaken without reference to the
Chinese Government and the level of fiscal reserves which
would be left for the successor government in Hong Kong
after 1997. These clauses addressed the abiding fears on
the Chinese side that as a result of the airport project the
government of the new Special Administrative Region would
find itself with empty coffers on the day after the hand-
over.
The agreement
was
welcomed with relief and
enthusiasm in Hong Kong and the Hang Seng index shot up. A