damage. It turned out rather differently.
A major factor, which became apparent on the
afternoon of 28 June, when I saw him, was Li Peng's interest
in an early visit by John Major to sign any agreement we
reached. In Peking's planning the airport was therefore to
become an instrument in China's full rehabilitation after
Tiananmen. This greatly assisted our leverage. Nor was it
so extravagant a wish as some of the commentators made it
seem: the international "quarantine consensus" of June
1989 had already crumbled; the Japanese Prime Minister was
coming to Peking in August, the Italian Prime Minister
probably in September. But there were problems in Li Peng's
wish to delay any announcement on the airport until full
signature: that could mean months of delay, with leaks and
uncertainties in the interval. We wanted work to begin at
once, at least on the most urgent of the core projects.
There would undoubtedly be domestic sensitivity
about a visit by Mr. Major to Peking. But there
powerful arguments in its favour, relating to the airport,
Hong Kong's confidence and prosperity, and the recovery of
Sino-British cooperation, both over the territory and
generally. I put them as cogently as I could in my telegram
home, adding that there would be advantage in the Prime
Minister raising the issue of Human rights on the visit and
letting it be known that he had done so.
The Prime Minister had little time to brood on the
matter and he was in any case deeply engaged with his
European Community colleagues at a summit in Luxemburg. But
he reacted rapidly and favourably and we were grateful to
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