talks with the Chinese. The Foreign Secretary visited China
in April, tried for agreement and came very near reaching
it. But the Chinese remained elusive. They shifted their
ground. New demands appeared or old demands were
resurrected. What they seemed to be seeking were two
things. First, extreme financial reassurance in the form of
guarantees of money to be left in the Hong Kong reserves
after the construction of the airport and limitations on
a demand that
government borrowing, SO that the new site and its
buildings would come to them almost as a gift. Second, and
most worrying, they sought a generalised right of veto over
major Hong Kong decisions in the transitional period. The
veto claim was not baldly stated; the Chinese Foreign
Minister denied that it was being made; it was concealed in
certain matters should be subject to
consultation and consensus; but the meaning was clear
enough. At its most ambitious, the claim was that consensus
should be reached on any responsibility or obligation to be
taken on by the Government of the Special Administrative
Region. It was impossible to reconcile this with the
British Government's responsibility, acknowledged in the
Joint Declaration, for administering Hong Kong until 1997.
Nor was there, among these large and generalised demands,
any sign of the precision and certainty that we needed on
finance, on franchises, on consultation, if the Hong Kong
authorities were to get on with the project, and that
private investors needed if they were to venture their
money.
This was the situation in the summer of 1991. A
И
breakdown looked likely. The Chinese were threatening to
publish their account of the negotiations in order το
demonstrate British "insincerity". There was a point fast
approaching when the Governor could no longer postpone a
public decision: the calls for tenders on two of the main
contracts were overdue.
Steps were taken to make plain to the Chinese the
essentials of our position. We must have cooperation from
them. We must also have clarity and certainty if we were to
embark on the work. Failing that, we would reluctantly be
obliged to postpone the whole project.
This message almost certainly made an impact and
corrected any expectations the Chinese might have had that,
since our need for the airport was extreme, their exactions
could safely continue.
At this point I became involved as an actor rather
than simply an adviser and observer. It was decided to send
me to Peking as the Prime Minister's representative on a
make-or-break visit. The main bones of the story follow;
but I shall have to draw a veil over the detail of my
discussions in Peking: at the time of writing negotiations
on the airport continue and I would not want these memoirs
to prejudice them in any way.
For reasons which I shall not go into here, the
preliminaries to the visit followed a strange and indirect
pattern. Final agreement to travel came, as I remember, in a
telephone call from Zimbabwe and my plan to go by
Scandinavian Airlines, SO as to avoid Hong Kong, was
transformed in the telling to a message that I would be
flown in by the S.A.S. But I eventually arrived in Peking,
by orthodox means, on 27 June without incident.
Like my excursion in December 1989, it was meant
to be a secret visit. It remained relatively discreet until
the work was done, though an alert Daily Telegraph reporter
spotted me in the first twenty-four hours. I travelled
alone. This time I had Robin McLaren already at the other
end, as our newly installed Ambassador; and I thought the
two of us should be able to do whatever was necessary. In the
event we drew heavily on the help of his Counsellor, David
Coates, and First Secretary, Janet Rogan; and the whole of
his Embassy was mobilised in support.
There was no Hong Kong representative present.
This was unfortunate, but, in the circumstances,
unavoidable. The Governor, whom I had seen in London the day
before leaving, was very understanding; and he and his
Executive Council were kept throughout in the closest
touch.
I set out with low expectations, a less than fifty
per cent chance of success as I saw it. The ground had been
thoroughly worked over and the Chinese demands were
extreme. I had about three days: Li Peng, the Chinese Prime
Minister, was leaving for the Middle East that weekend. I
had to make it clear that this was the last word. The best
scenario, it seemed, would be the discovery of enough
common ground to support an agreed minute and to justify a
further meeting of experts to draw up an agreement. But
equally plausible was the scenario in which both sides
acknowledged disagreement and, perhaps, tried to limit the
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