steps to reassure Hong Kong. And, most important, there was
a growing realisation on the Chinese side that in this
massive project, straddling the hand-over, and critically
dependent on private
on private finance, and therefore on Chinese
endorsement, they had a powerful lever,
a powerful lever, with which to
assert their claim to greater control of the territory in
the transitional phase.
The Hong Kong Government held expert talks to
inform and reassure Peking, three rounds in all. They
certainly informed, but they apparently did not reassure;
and Hong Kong decisions, relating to preliminary work on
the project and coinciding with the first round of talks,
gave the Chinese an opening to denounce publicly what they
could represent as unilateral moves, "insincere attitudes"
and inadequate consultation. It is true that Peking could
have been handled more sensitively; but it is questionable
whether this would have much affected the outcome. The
Chinese used the talks for propaganda purposes and
advanced a series of extravagant demands as preconditions
for their
agreement.
These demands were for very
considerable sums to be set aside from the Hong Kong fiscal
reserves and for veto powers, not only on the airport
authority, but more widely in the financial sphere.
Discussion moved to a higher level: the Governor
talked to Lu Ping, now Director of the Hong Kong and Macao
Office, and to Li Peng, the Chinese Premier. A combined
Foreign Office and Hong Kong team of officials under Andrew
the Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary for
the Far East, underwent two long and punishing rounds of
3