confidential negotiations in the old style between London and Peking. We are all negotiators now, though some of us have come to it
later than others. Nor is it reasonable to argue that, as among
negotiators, I represent appeasement and surrender: as in 1982-4, and as I have said publicly, I advocate negotiating for as much as we can get, provided always we recognise that an agreed settlement is much preferable to breakdown. This is one of the themes of the book;
how then can it undermine?
In other words, I cannot agree that the book will weaken the present British position. I do accept that it may cause offence on the British side by rehearsing the causes of the present crisis, as I see them. You might well prefer that there was no book in prospect. But
that is a different issue.
One final point on this aspect. You cannot reasonably expect me
in a book of this kind to omit a defence of the policy of cooperation
with China for the benefit of Hong Kong, with which I am closely
associated, which has come under repeated public attack, and which I have so far not formally expounded and justified. Nor could I be expected to omit an explanation of how I came to speak out in December 1992. This is public debate not a question of disclosure from the
archives. Yet this is what your request for excision of the
penultimate chapter amounts to.
As regards the airport, it is an essential ingredient of the present crisis; my part in the 1991 agreement is well-known; I could
hardly omit some account of what went on. The exchanges are almost all
public knowledge. As an example, I enclose a copy of an article in the South China Morning Post of July 1991. As you will see, the Prime
Minister's letter to Li Peng figures prominently; and there is much
else. Against this background the chapter in the book is hardly
revelatory. Nor could publication of an account of such exchanges by
a well known dissident be attributed to the Government; it might be
different if you were publishing or leaking yourselves. I cannot
believe therefore that the book would cause the Chinese to withdraw
from talks on the airport which they have resumed on good tactical grounds of their own. But, if this chapter gives you trouble, I could consider some minor reworking: for example, the reference to the Prime Minister's message to and to the reply could be taken out. I
could perhaps discuss this with someone from the Foreign Office.
The choice you present me with in your final paragraph is a hard