On the British side the
Government expressed
ther full backing for Mr Patten; and the Foreign Secretary
stated that the days of negotiation with Peking over the
head of Hong Kong were past. In Hong Kong the Governor was
criticised by the business community, but otherwise
enjoyed much personal support, though this was coupled with
a strong popular wish that confrontation with China should
be avoided, a typical Hong Kong combination. In Britain
itself attitudes were less nuancé. The press preferred to
portray the issue in the terms of a simple morality play, in
which the Governor fought the good fight against the wicked
Chinese in the cause of democracy. The fact that the
struggle took place over the body of Hong Kong and the
likely effect on Hong Kong if the reforms were made law and
the Chinese threats were put into operation were aspects
that received less attention.
By the end of 1992 Sino-British relations had
fallen to their lowest level for some ten years. The speed
of the deterioration and the strength of the Chinese
response suggested that, contrary to popular perception,
earlier negotiations had gone near the limits of Chinese
tolerance.
Diplomacy was not entirely asleep, however. It
seems that the British Government were by this time x
sufficiently concerned at the crisis to put out feelers to
Peking for talks without preconditions; and for some months
in early 1993 the British Ambassador, Sir Robin McLaren,
conducted delicate talks about talks. After an unfortunate
interruption in March, coinciding with the meeting of the
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