the Chinese tolerance of the concept of direct elections
developed in the period 1984 to 1989. When, in late 1983, I
first raised the possibility of direct elections before
1997 the reaction was one of horrified dismissal.
Much was also made of an alleged failure by London
to involve Hong Kong further in the negotiations on its
future. The charge rested largely on an inability to
appreciate the strength of Peking's objections to any
direct Hong Kong participation. This included an angry
refusal to deal with Hong Kong as an independent point in
the triangle, total resistance to any idea of a referendum
in 1984, and non-recognition of the official position of
Chinese Exco and Legco members. If it wished to help Hong
Kong, Britain had to use the only channels available. As
regards consultation between the metropolitan and colonial
governments, this was close and constant: Exco were privy
to every move. Wider consultation, as with the Legislative
Council or the Hong Kong public, during secret negotiations
would have been unprecedented and impracticable, even if
Peking had acqiesced.
Nevertheless, there were
symptoms of malaise and
they were given a new edge by the events of June, 1989. In
that atmosphere of outrage and emotion the rationale of the
Joint Declaration and of
of Sino-British cooperation was
forgotten by the commentators and the wish that things had
been otherwise became obsessive. We heard much more of the
"hand-over of 6 million people" and of "betrayal" and
"appeasement". The whole process of dealing with Peking in
a constructive way became suspect.
4