breakdown looked likely. The Chinese were threatening to
publish their account of the negotiations in order to
demonstrate British "insincerity". There was a point fast
approaching when the Governor could no longer postpone a
public decision: the calls for tenders on two of the main
contracts were overdue.
Steps were taken to make plain to the Chinese the
essentials of our position. We must have cooperation from
them. We must also have clarity and certainty if we were to
embark on the work. Failing that, we would reluctantly be
obliged to postpone the whole project.
• NFS · VAN DE
This message almost certainly made an impact and
corrected any expectations the Chinese might have had that,
since our need for the airport was extreme, their exactions
could safely continue. [ ]
At this point I became involved as an actor rather
than simply an adviser and observer. It was decided to send
me to. Peking as the Prime Minister's representative on a
make-or-break visit. It is a curious story, which will have
to be reserved for a later occasion. Equally, I shall have
to draw a veil over the detail of my negotiations in Peking:
at the time of writing negotiations on the airport continue
and I would not want these memoirs to prejudice them in any
way.
The preliminaries to the visit followed a strange
and indirect pattern. Final agreement to travel came, as I
remember, in a telephone call from Zimbabwe and my plan to
go by Scandinavian Airlines, so as to avoid Hong Kong, was
transformed in the telling to a message that I would be