governmental
manouevres, by what they see as a subordinate body, will
have much impact on the Chinese, who will concentrate on
British government policy and the rupture in the inter-
negotiations. Unless there is a major
retreat by London (on the grounds that Hong Kong does not
want a confrontation), the Chinese threats, of setting up
an alternative centre of authority at once, and of
dismantling the legislature in 1997, will undoubtedly be
implemented; and there will be an ugly stand-off over the
territory in the remaining years of transition. Observers
will be driven to the conclusion that the antagonisms of
one hundred and fifty years were spectres not after all to
be so easily laid; and Britain and China will end their
dealings on Hong Kong as they began, in misunderstanding
and hostility. With the difference, that this time
superior power will not rest with Britain.
In such an event, it will no doubt be argued in
justification that honour required us to leave Hong Kong
with an
improved level of democracy, with credible
elections in 1995, and with the attributes of a free and
open society. But in fact the effect of the confrontation
will be to ensure that the legislature is uprooted in 1997
and democracy thereby permanently impaired.
elections will be held in circumstances of unprecedented
pressure from the mainland; their results will be negated
two years later; and, as a result of strains on the Chinese
commitment to the political settlement
1995
of 1984, the
safeguards for the territory as a free society will be
weakened. In all respects Hong Kong will be left in a worse
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