a worse state than it was in before the new approach was
tried in 1992.
It will be a tragedy, the greater for being
avoidable. In distributing blame, the future historian
will note Chinese intransigence and an apparent wish,
contrary to Chinese tradition and interest, to humiliate
their opponents. But he will also note, on the British
side, a consistent misreading of Chinese attitudes and
tolerance.
However unreasonable, the Chinese position
was well known before the 1992 venture began; and there
were plentiful warnings of the effect of disregarding it.
Given the balance of power between the two sides, these
were facts to be given great weight in British
calculations; they seem
they seem to have been underestimated or
discounted. The public nature of the first British
approach made dignified retreat hard for both sides. The
British objectives remained throughout unrealistically
high. And, given the clear prospect of damage to the
colony flowing from unilateral action, it will be hard to
explain British resort to it except on the basis of a
determined refusal to believe that the Chinese meant what
they said. How otherwise could a government putting Hong
Kong's interests
interests first make the move? It will seem a
puzzling as well as a fatal decision.
Bismarck in a
reflective mood once used a fine
image to
to illustrate the limits on
statesmanship. He
pictured the powers travelling on
on the stream of time,
which they can neither create nor direct, but on which they
can steer with more or less skill and experience. The key
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