await the outcome of the discussions between capitals and
ready when they were concluded to pass the appropriate
legislation.
Sino-British
In a wider sense also, the agreement to open talks
between London and Peking was a watershed in the crisis. For
some six months there had been a new approach and style in
dealings over Hong Kong, an apparent
readiness to go it alone and embark on direct trials of
strength. In practice it had proved, to put it mildly,
counter-productive. Far from establishing an alternative
policy, the experience had become a demonstration that,
confrontation apart, there was no alternative: Britain and
China were condemned to co-operate over Hong Kong. Though
there was а natural reluctance to admit it, the two
traditional course of
governments
were
now back on the
nnegotiation between capitals,
as practised by the
mandarins and sinologues of the previous decade.
The negotiations would of course be tough. The
subject was highly charged and significant damage had been
done. Chinese suspicions had been reinforced and their
hostile analysis of British policy seemingly vindicated.
Hong Kong society had been polarized and political
intrusion from the mainland accelerated. The terms that
might have been secured in quiet discussions in October
would be much harder to obtain after six months of trench
warfare. Any settlement would require a drastic lowering of
sights on the British side. But at least there was a return
to rational discussion.
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