be
the manner and the substance of the proposals. On the first,
although they were told of the substance of the Governor's
speech two weeks in advance, their request that they should
consulted (which in their eyes probably meant
negotiation) before the speech was delivered was rejected.
This was contrary to previous practice and, as they saw it,
to provisions in the Joint Declaration, which required
closer consultation in the later stages of the transitional
period. The substance of the proposals, by greatly widening
electorate, in their view contravened earlier Sino-
British understandings expressed in the Joint Declaration,
the Basic Law and the exchanges of letters on directly
elected seats of 1989-90. (The British naturally contested
this reading.) The Chinese rejected the right of Legco, to
the
them a purely advisory body, to pronounce on the future of
their territory. To them the reforms and the manner of their
promulgation represented a 180 degree turn in British
policy on co-operation and convergence. They went further
and claimed to detect a conspiracy aiming to enhance Hong
Kong's independence and spread the virus of democracy to
the mainland. The fact that the United States, Canadian and
Australian governments warmly endorsed the Governor's
constitutional plans confirmed Peking in the instinctive
suspicion that there was international backing for such a
plot.
A confrontation rapidly developed. On the Chinese
side there was sustained invective and threats to abolish
the legislature in 1997 if the new arrangements
implemented and to set up before that date a 'second
were
10