overawed by China, that they surrendered automatically to
Peking's demands, or even, by anticipation, before the
demands were formulated. 'Preemptive cringe' was a phrase
much employed. It was also claimed that they saw Hong Kong
a tiresome diversion from the main business of Sino-
British relations, which was pictured as some twentieth
century equivalent of the 'Great Game' played by Britain
and Russia in Central Asia in the nineteenth century.
as
It was strange stuff. No official I came across
had any illusions about the regime we were dealing with in
Peking. We had all been through the mill. No-one had any
doubt of the primacy of Hong Kong in our dealings with
China. Nor did we justify British policy on any other
grounds. The accommodations with Peking were not prompted
by regard for China, but by the calculation that any other
course would have been much more damaging to Hong Kong. It
was throughout a policy of cool realism, recognizing the
immutable facts of the situation and directed to providing
the maximum protection for the territory in the difficult
circumstances in which it was placed. And it was endorsed
and applied by a succession of ministers, none of whom could
be described as a sentimentalist on China or a push-over in
negotiations. Every position was stubbornly fought, and
concessions made only after a scrupulous balance of profit
and loss
loss for Hong Kong.
Hong Kong. If there had been
practical course we would have been overjoyed to learn of
it. Defiance was naturally always tempting. But it was one
thing to be defiant when we in Britain would bear the
consequences ourselves. To be defiant at the expense of a
any other
6