phrase is 'which they can neither create nor direct'.
Those in charge of Sino-British relations in the years of
co-operation perhaps overerestimated their capacity to
direct events and to impose a rational framework on
irrational forces. They discounted the still unexhausted
reserves of prejudice and emotion on each side, the deeper
currents in the stream.
It is sad to have to leave the Hong Kong story at
this point, with so much to do and so much that has been
done brought into question, with the main issue still
unresolved and the risk SO high that damaging and
irrevocable decisions will be taken. We are back on that
famous window ledge from which the Unofficials were more
than once rescued in the 1982-4 negotiations, and this
time saddled with stronger suicidal impulses. But it
would be wrong to be totally despondent. Even if, as it
seems, we are condemned to follow the dark scenario, the
whole achievement of the time of co-operation will not be
lost. Those thirteen years, from 1979, when the issue of
the lease was first raised, indirectly and with some
trepidation, during Sir Murray
Murray MacLehose's visit to
Peking, have left a foundation work of agreements and
habits of consultation which cannot be entirely erased. In
particular, even in the worst case, the Joint Declaration,
the territory's sheet-anchor, should survive, though
under strain. If that happens, it will be ironic, though
providential, that the main product of a rejected policy
should be the insurance against the full consequences of
its successor and should supply the safety net against
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