!
have much impact on the Chinese, who will concentrate on
British government policy and the rupture in the inter-
governmental negotiations. As I see it, unless there is a
major retreat by London (on the grounds that Hong Kong does
not want a confrontation), the Chinese threats, of setting
up an alternative centre of authority at once, and of
dismantling the legislature in 1997, will undoubtedly be
implemented; and there will be an ugly stand-off over the
territory in the remaining years of transition. Observers
will be driven to the conclusion that the antagonisms of
one hundred and fifty years were spectres not after all to
be so easily laid; and Britain and China will end their
dealings on Hong Kong as they began, in misunderstanding
and hostility. With the difference, that this time
superior power will not rest with Britain.
In such an event, it will no doubt be argued in
justification that honour required us to leave Hong Kong
with an improved level of democracy, with credible
elections in 1995, and with the attributes of a free and
open society. But in fact the effect of the confrontation
will almost certainly be to ensure that the legislature is
uprooted in 1997 and democracy thereby permanently
impaired. It seems only too likely that the 1995 elections
will be held in circumstances of unprecedented pressure
from the mainland; that their results will be negated two
years later; and that, as a result of strains on the
Chinese commitment to the political settlement of 1984,
the safeguards for the territory as a free society will be
weakened. In these circumstances Hong Kong will be left in
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