CONFIDENTIAL
JFOS
provision of afloat HQ. were studying C2 of the final withdrawal in detail in 1994, and the NSWG should take account of this work.
Requirement/date
for
SH
14.
C.
(d)
afloat base.
(e)
Logistic
(2)
requirements.
Identify programming
s u port
milestones
for the preparation and sailing of the necessary vessels.
(3) Cost each option on the basis of additional costs to CINCFLEET over and above those for the currently planned CVS group exercise deployment to the Far East in 1997.
(4)
Consider options for supporting the RN Patrol Craft over the last months. To include consideration of a 'Guard Ship' concept to support CBF in maintaining Territorial Integrity.
(5) Chairman of the NSWG to provide a verbal update on progress made to the HKSC 3 Mar 94, and a written report for consideration by the HKSC in Sep 94.
Subsequent Discussion. DDNO stated that the NSWG work was already well advanced. This had been based on a worst case assumption that the last battalion might have to operate from ships for up to 6 weeks, and be finally removed by sea, but that any reinforcing battalions would move in and out of HK by air. NSWG talks with the General Staff on
the detailed arrangements would begin
begin shortly. CBF remarked that, whilst it was prudent to prepare for a worst case situation, the possible negative impact in HK and China of a high-profile NTF should be taken fully into account. Also, the possibility of civil disorder at the end should not be
over-stated.
The future structure of BFHK was presented by ACOS J3 HQBF HK. The presentation highlighted the process of 'report, scrutinize, implement', that CBF is applying to this subject. Copies of the slides used to support this presentation are at Enclosure 2. The presentation was based on the recently concluded 'Study of the Future Structure of BFHK', which was circulated to the single-Services and Supporting Commanders on 3
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CONFIDENTIAL
DNO
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