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Hong Kong but will be able to reinforce the Garrison within 10 days if required to do so (paras 6 and 7).
b. The RAF (Wessex) helicopter support for the Garrison should be maintained at a level of 4 AE + 2 IUR from 1 Apr 94 (para 8).
C. The AAC (Scout) helicopter support for the Garrison should end. The Brunei Garrison flight should be accorded independent flight status and be supported by UKLF as soon as practicable. (para 9).
d.
The future organisation, levels of command and establishment of a truly Joint HQ for BFHK will be determined by the Future Structure of BFHK Study (paras 10 and 11).
e.
CBF Hong Kong should be given Full
should be given Full Command of all elements of the Hong Kong Garrison (less RN ships at sea and the Wessex helicopter squadron) by 1 Apr 94. (para 12).
£.
Command of the British Garrison in Brunei should pass to HQ UKLF on 1 Apr 95 (para 13).
Intelligence continuity is to be maintained as long as necessary (para 14).
g.
h.
of
A tri-Service logistic organisation capable providing appropriate support to the Garrison will be determined by the ACDS (L) Review of Logistic Support in Hong Kong (para 15).
i. There is a requirement to revise JTP 30 by 31 Dec 93 and exercise it by the end of 1994 (paras 16 and 17).
j. Notwithstanding a faster rundown of LEP, there is a clear need to retain LEP in key posts until Oct 96, in order to avoid the financial and manning penalties of the unplanned deployment of UKTAP to fill LEP posts at short notice in 1996/97. A retention incentive scheme should be staffed as an Alternative Assumption in LTC 94 (paras 18 and 19).
k. There is a need to review JTP 68 in 1994, and annually thereafter (para 20).
1.
A possible future requirement to offer incentives to retain LEC in key posts should be noted (paras 21 and 22).
m.
D Sales (Disposals) should delegate disposal authority to HQBF HK (paras 23 and 24).
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