D/Sec (0) (C) 6/7
7 May 1993
SECRET
APS/Secretary of State through DPSO/CDS
copy to: MA/Minister (AF)
PS/US of S
HKA 063/1 RECEIVED
17 MAY 1993
MESK OF
AY
Nation Taken
58
no probably
about it!
PS/PUS
Sec/CNS
MA/CGS
PS/CAS
MA/VCDS
MA/DCDS (C)
ACDS (0)
AUS (C)
AUS (Prog)
AUS (GF)
DO (FEW)
DMO
DASD
Head of GS Sec
Head of RP (Army)
Press Secretary Special Adviser
FCO (Hong Kong Dept)
HONG KONG: THE FUTURE OF THE GARRISON
D
сом
10/5/93
10/5
Metris Mr Jults 10/5.
When He Defence see's note
1
issues, subject to
Алм
view l
we get from Ministers I my note of 7 May,
we shid chip in a from K1 S/S Confirming no objection to 'x'
commer
é perheps 1. You asked for initial advice on Mr Patten's response (copy edersing attached at Annex A for ease of reference) to the Secretary of idea d'a State's letter of 15 April which enclosed a suggested policy BOD(k) paper
framework for the future size and shape of the garrison between now and 1997.
53
2. Although Mr Patten's message is not totally clear cut, it is evident that financial arguments are leading
leading the Hong Kong government to support the idea of a garrison based around one battalion rather than two. The Governor seems to believe that the political consequences with China and any risk to stability of à more precipitate run down of the garrison would be manageable. The arguments for and against an early reduction to one battalion were rehearsed in the short paper attached to Mr Howard's note of 2 April which concluded that the operational arguments were not decisive, but that there might be political implications both in Hong Kong and with China, and that such a reduction would probably be financially disadvantageous to MOD. Since then, the prospect of greater pressure on Army manpower has increased and in the light of that and the Governor's views, there is a strong case for amending our plans and going for a faster run down to one battalion, notwithstanding the military preference for two. This would mean accepting the modest increase in political and military risk that might result and the financial consequences for the defence budget.
15.
SECRET