SECRET
is being increasingly questioned in Hong Kong and LEGCO has
become more and more reluctant to meet its share of the costs
under the DCA. Given that the Finance Committee of LEGCO
effectively has a power of veto over any expenditure proposals from the government, it is the Governor's judgement that he will
not be able to meet Hong Kong's obligation under the DCA unless
it can be demonstrated to LEGCO that the costs of the garrison.
are declining steeply. (The Hong Kong government is already in
breach of the DCA because of an unwillingness to seek a supplementary estimate from LEGCO to meet their share of the full
costs of the garrison in 1992/3.) He therefore favours a much more rapid run down of the garrison to one based around a single infantry battalion, even if that means giving up its capacity to
support the police without external re-inforcement.
4. From the UK point of view, there is also a good case for
withdrawing infantry units from Hong Kong and redeploying them to increase our flexibilityin dealing with current commitments
eg in Northern Ireland and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Military implications
5. The minimum requirement for two battalions in Hong Kong, which
has been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff, is based on the
assumption that one battalion would be required to guard key
points and reinforcement reception points, leaving the other
available to relieve the RHKP on the Sino-Hong Kong border. The
latter would release about 500 additional policemen for internal
security duties in the Territory. (The current strength of the
RHKP is about 26,500.) Should the garrison reduce to a single
battalion, only the first of these tasks could be accomplished.
In effect the garrison would, without re-inforcement, no longer
have a role in maintaining internal security in Hong Kong.
6. Such a change would involve some risk. There would be a modest diminution in the numbers of police available to deal with major
SECRET