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5.
The risks of a faster withdrawal are that if major internal unrest developed more quickly than the time needed to reinforce the garrison (up to seven days), it might be on such a scale as to threaten to overwhelm the police. The probability of this is assessed as low. But it could arise in three ways. First, the Chinese could inspire disturbances in a repeat of 1967, although this is increasingly unlikely as 1997 approaches. Second, there could be internally generated disturbances most probably for economic reasons, eg the collapse of a major bank. Third there could be a reaction in Hong Kong to upheaval or repression in the mainland, as in the massive (but peaceful) demonstrations which followed the Tiananmen incident in 1989. Under any of the three scenarios, if it appeared that the police were unable to maintain order the Chinese might be tempted to intervene themselves. The temptation would be stronger if the Chinese perceived that HMG did not have the force immediately available to deal with the unrest. Credible and effective reinforcement arrangements would be essential.
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opd(K).para
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