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garrison are met by the Hong Kong government. In 1992/3, this
amounted to £135m.
3. The garrison has to be withdrawn in its entirety by 30 June
1997. For the last six months the land element of the garrison
is planned to consist of a single UK battalion on an uanccompanied emergency tour. Current plans envisage a staged withdrawal of forces, with the aim of maintaining a balanced military capability, based around two infantry battalions, to carry out the tasks set out above until late 1996, taking into account improvements that have been and continue to be made in
the ability of the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) to carry out internal security functions. (For example, the RHKP now have full responsibility for policing the Sino-Hong Kong border.) However, the requirement for the land element of the garrison and the RAF and Army helicopters deployed to support it is being increasingly questioned in the Territory. The Finance Committee of LEGCO effectively has a power of veto over any government expenditure proposals. It is the Governor's judgement that the entire DCA could be called into question unless it can be demonstrated to
LEGCO that the costs of the garrison are declining significantly. (He has already ruled out approaching LEGCO for additional funds and the Hong Kong government is already in breach of the DCA because of an unwillingness to seek a supplementary estimate from
LEGCO to meet their share of the full costs of the garrison in X 1992/3.) He therefore favours a much more rapid run-down of the garrison to one based around a single infantry battalion, even if that means giving up its capability to support the police
without external re-inforcement.
No
4.
From the UK point of view,
of view, there
there is also advantage in
withdrawing infantry units from Hong Kong and redeploying them
to increase our flexibility in dealing with current commitments
eg in Northern Ireland and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, though the financial costs to the defence budget would be significant.
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