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existing worries that the Hong Kong government is no longer "execeutive led".) As far as possible we should also take account of the wider context of relations with China over Hong Kong,
including talks on constitutional development.
12. The majority of people in Hong Kong will
will welcome the
reduction in the costs of the garrison. Some however may question
whether an accelerated run-down reflected a lessening of HMG's
political commitment to Hong Kong. A few may express concern at
the removal of an immediate capacity to support the police. Reaction in the UK will focus on the wider picture of the ability
of the UK to meet its military commitments, rather than any perceived diminution of the UK's commitment to Hong Kong in the
last three years of our sovereignty.
13. The announcement and public handling of such a reduction would also require careful handling, both in Hong Kong and in the
UK. We will need to be able to counter claims that we are
abandoning Hong Kong and moreover that we are doing so to relieve overstretch in the Army.
Finance
14. The Hong Kong government will benefit financially from these
proposals as a result of having to pay 65% of the costs of a sharply reduced garrison. Initial calculations indicate that this
would generate savings for them of about £100m, compared with existing plans, over the period 1993/4-1997/8, with the majority
of the savings accruing in 1995/6 and 1996/7. For HMG there would
be savings from reductions in military infrastructure in Hong
Kong and the release of locally employed and enlisted personnel.
However, to the extent that personnel and units are redeployed
rather than disbanded (primarily the UK infantry battalion), MOD would lose receipts from the Hong Kong government. The net effect
is likely to be an additional cost of up to £30m over the same five year period. This further burden on the defence budget is
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