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reasons, at the instigation of the Hong Kong government, They are
not affected by these proposals.
9. Overall, there is a risk involved, not least that we might be committed, not only to reinforcement, but also to a continuing
roulement should our risk assessment prove to have been
inaccurate. That said the balance is in favour of the increased
flexibility elsewhere in the Army at a time when commitments in
Northern Ireland and with the UN show no sign of reducing.
Political and presentational implications
10. The Chinese leadership have a deep rooted fear of turbulence on Hong Kong in the last years of British administration. They will be concerned that any accelerated reduction in the garrison
could have an adverse impact on our ability to maintain order. They could also interpret such a reduction as an indication of
a diminished British commitment to Hong Kong. Among officials directly concerned with Hong Kong, and in the Chinese military,
there could be suspicion that an early reduction was part of a
strategy intended to deprive the Chinese garrison of some part of the military estate which they hope to inherit in Hong Kong
after 1997, and/or to make the size of their garrison (reportedly planned at 10,000 troops plus support units) appear excessive.
It is therefore probable that the Chinese would see a number of
reasons to object to our revised plans.
11. We are committed to keeping the Chinese informed of our planning for the withdrawal of the garrison through the Sino- British Joint Liaison Group. We do not regard ourselves as bound
to seek their concurrence but it would be important to present
a decision to accelerate the run down in such a way as to minimise the risk of an adverse public reaction. A plausible explanation for the decision would need to be given which avoided reference to difficulties with LEGCO over financing if the run
down was not accelerated. (Use of this argument would re-inforce
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