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9. Overall, there is a risk involved, not least that we might
be committed, not only to reinforcement, but also to a continuing
roulement should our risk assessment prove to have been
inaccurate. That said the balance is in favour of the increased
flexibility elsewhere in the Army at a time when commitments in
Northern Ireland and with the UN show no sign of reducing.
Political and presentational implications
10.
:
The Chinese leadership have a deep rooted fear of turbulence
on Hong Kong in the last years of British administration. They
will be concerned that any accelerated reduction in the garrison
could have an adverse impact on our ability to maintain order.
They could also interpret such a reduction as an indication of a
diminished British commitment to Hong Kong. Among officials
directly concerned with Hong Kong, and in the Chinese military,
there could be suspicion that an early reduction was part of a
strategy intended to deprive the Chinese garrison of some part of
the military estate which they hope to inherit in Hong Kong after
1997, and/or to make the size of their garrison (reportedly
planned at 10,000 troops plus support units) appear excessive.
It is therefore probable that the Chinese would see a number of
reasons to object to our revised plans.
11. We are committed to keeping the Chinese informed of our
planning for the withdrawal of the garrison through the Sino-
British Joint Liaison Group, and will do so. We do not regard
ourselves as bound to seek their concurrence but it would be
important to present a decision to accelerate the run down in
such a way as to minimise the risk of an adverse public reaction.
PA/S/2.033
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