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withdrawing infantry units from Hong Kong and redeploying them to increase our flexibility in dealing with current commitments
eg in Northern Ireland and the former Republic of Yugoslavia,
though the financial costs to the defence budget would be significant.
Military implications
5. The requirement for two battalions in Hong Kong, which has been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff as the minimum appropriate
for current tasks, is based on the assessed threat and a consequent BFHK concept of operations that requires one battalion to guard key points, the defence estate and reinforcement reception points (including Kai Tak airport), leaving the other available to relieve the RHKP on the Sino-Hong Kong border. The
latter would release about 700 additional operational policemen (four police tactical units (PTUs)) for internal security duties
in the Territory. (The current strength of the RHKP is just over
27,000 which normally includes 12 other PTUS. After full
mobilisation the RHKP could deploy a total of 31 IS PTUS not
including the four on the border.) Should the garrison reduce to
a single battalion it would, without re-inforcement, no longer
be capable of relieving the police on the Sino-Hong Kong border.
6. Such
Such a change would involve some risk (which the Governor
accepts). There would be a diminution in the numbers of police
available to deal with major unrest should that occur. HMG would
not have immediate recourse within the Territory to a body of British controlled, trained and disciplined manpower to act as
a backstop should the RHKP lose control of the situation. But the
risk would arise only if major internal unrest developed more quickly than the time needed to re-inforce the garrison (seven
to ten days) and was on such a scale as to threaten to overwhelm
the police. The probability of major unrest is assessed as low,
but it could arise in three ways. First, the Chinese could
inspire disturbances, though this is increasingly unlikely as
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