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with existing plans, over the period 1993/4-1997/8, with the
majority of the savings accruing in 1995/6 and 1996/7. For HMG
there would be savings from reductions in military infrastructure
in Hong Kong and the release of locally employed and enlisted
personnel.
However, to the extent that personnel and units are
redeployed rather than disbanded (primarily the UK infant.ry
battalion), MOD would lose receipts from the Hong Kong
government.
The net effect is likely to be an additional cost of
up to £30m over the same five year period. This further burden
on the defence budget is unwelcome, but a proportion at least
could be incurred in any case if the Governor were unable to
secure LEGCO support for meeting the Hong Kong government's share
of a larger garrison's costs. Such a financial penalty could
also be accompanied by a constitutional row over what would be a
public breach of a formal agreement reached between HMG and the
Hong Kong government.
Conclusion and recommendation
15. There are military and political risks and financial
penalties associated with a more rapid run down of Hong Kong to a
one battalion garrison. The primary risk to the security of Hong
Kong would be a rapid breakdown in law and order which would be
beyond the capability of the RHKP to deal with. The chances of
that are low and would not be significantly increased by
reduction of the garrison to a symbolic level. But if these
circumstances arose not only might a weak garrison make Chinese
intervention more likely, but we would inevitably be committed to
re-inforcement and the possibility of increased roulement. The
political risk relates mainly to Chinese perceptions, and
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