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SECRET UK EYES A
continuity, changes to core PR manpower should cease after early 1995.
Responsibility for overall PR/P Info direction in Hong Kong rests with
the Press Secretary in MOD, although the management of day to day
issues will be controlled by CBF through the HQBF PR/P Info staff. The
potential sensitivities of the rundown of the Garrison underline the
need for continuing close liaison between MOD, CBF, the HKG and the
FCO: facilitated by a Press Policy Group (PPG), and ensuring the
development of coordinated PR and P Info policy.
Info policy. The PR/P Info
strategy should take full account of any parallel initiatives by the
FCO and HKG to influence the perceptions and attitudes of the populace
during the rundown to the final withdrawal.
THE LAST 12 MONTHS AND SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL DEPARTURE
36. The 1991 Review included a brief discussion of BFHK in the Last
12 Months. It concluded that at least one battalion plus supporting
elements would be required until 30 June 1997, and that the final
withdrawal of these forces might require the support of a Naval Task
Force (NTF). As directed by Cos, a Naval Working Group drew up a
paper for the Hong Kong Steering Committee (HKSC) on the possible
composition of a NTF to support the final withdrawal in 1997. The
Naval Working Group paper concluded that a NTF would provide
significant additional capabilities and operational flexibility to CBF
16
D/DNW/97/7/20/1
1991 Review Of The Options For The Composition of The Naval Task Force To Assist In THE Withdrawal From Hong Kong: A Paper By The Naval Staff, dated 13 February 1992.
20
SECRET UK EYES A
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