8.
DRAFT
SECRET UK EYES A
onsequently, there is no reason to retain specialist British
Army support capabilities, such as specialist dog units, search and
EOD teams, for use other than in direct support of military operations
after 1994. Military force levels need only reflect those required to
achieve the military mission as defined in the British Forces Hong
Kong (BFHK) concept of operations.
BRITISH FORCES HONG KONG CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
9. The improving capabilities of the RHKP during 1992 necessitated
a review and revision of the BFHK concept of operations. A new concept
of operations was published in October 1992. This acknowledged that
there was unlikely to be a general IS role for the small in-place
military forces, other than specific tasks such as the protection of
the Garrison estate and dependants, military KPS and the airport. A
force of up to battalion strength might be required to demonstrate
British Sovereignty on the Sino-Hong Kong border in a time of tension
with the PRC and before reinforcement. The concept of
The concept of operations
requires a a minimum availability of two battalions: with one being
available for deployment as required within the Territory and the
other committed to securing the defence estate and key points; in
particular the airhead, which is vital to the deployment of
reinforcements to Hong Kong under Joint Theatre Plan (JTP) 30.
10. The concept of operations requires the availability in-Theatre of
at least two battalions for as long as possible. However, at the end
5
SECRET UK EYES A
DRAFT