HONG KONG
LÓ IMMEDIATE MOD UK TELNO U/N
OF 2916512 APRIL 93
O
DANAN
SECRET ceF
Phut.boz
Lor Chas But. HEBF 001802
Lucic
CBF COS
ACTION COPY
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, PEKING, UKREP JLG HONG KONG CIVŠES
"
SIC
FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE FROM THE GOVERNOR
FCO FOR MR GOODLAD AND SIR JOHN COLES
PEKING FOR THE AMBASSADOR
UKREP JIG HONG KONG FOR MR GALSWORTHY
HQBF PERSONAL FOR CBF
FUTURE OF THE GARRISON
1. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE CHANCE OF AN INITIAL DISCUSSION OF THE 1993 REVIEW OF THE GARRISON WHEN WE MET ON 15 APRIL.
ROLE AND SIZE OF GARRISON
2. I GENERALLY AGREE WITH THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE GARRISON IN THE PAPER. I ALSO SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE KEY FACTOR DRIVING THE GARRISON'S OVERALL SIZE IS ITS POTENTIAL ROLE IN INTERNAL SECURITY. FOR THAT REASON, THE FUNCTIONS THE GARRISON MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO PLAY IN THIS ROLE NEED TO BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED IN THE REVIEW. THE GARRISON WAS LAST DEPLOYED ON THE STREETS IN AN INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE IN 1967. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD BE SO DEPLOYED AGAIN. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT IF THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER IN THE RUN-UP TO 1997, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO USE THE POLICE WHO NOW MAN THE BORDER TO REINFORCE THOSE ON THE STREETS, AND TO USE THE ARMY TO REPLACE THE POLICE ON THE BORDER. WHILE THE ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS IS CLEARLY FOR YOU, IT MUST - AS I SAID WHEN WE MET - BE QUESTIONABLE WHETHER TWO BATTALIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THIS TASK ALONE, AT LEAST INITIALLY. IF THERE WAS A REAL NEED TO DEPLOY THE ARMY ON THE BORDER FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD, REINFORCEMENT COULD SURELY BE CONSIDERED.
3. THERE IS ALSO, AS WE DISCUSSED WHEN WE MET, A CHINESE ANGLE. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT IN MY VIEW DECISIVE. WE ARE COMMITTED TO KEEP THE CHINESE INFORMED THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE GARRISON. THIS WILL NEED CAREFUL HANDLING. THE CHINESE WILL DOUBTLESS PRESS US TO KEEP A GARRISON AS LARGE AS POSSIBLE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. BUT I WOULD QUESTION THE ASSESSMENT IN THE PAPER THAT CHINA IS MORE LIKELY TO INTERVENE IN HONG KONG BEFORE 1997 IF WE OPT FOR A FASTER PACE OF WITHDRAWAL, OR THAT THE PRESENT TENSIONS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA HAVE A SIGNIFICANT BEARING ON THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT IN HONG KONG. IN MY VIEW, WE DO NOT NEED TO RULE OUT OR DEFER CONSIDERATION OF THE
DEFENCE AND PUBLIC ORDER: REVIEW OF THE GARRISON WITHDRAWAL PLAN A: SFORS
D: HE CS FS PA(3) JLG(1) PS/GH(4) -
NOTE: PERSONAL COVERS
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