SECRET UK EYES A
S
to
d. Policy guidance will be needed on the political and public relations profile of the final withdrawal assuming a benign environment. This will influence the decision, be made relatively soon, about whether the withdrawal of the garrison should be supported by an RN task group, based around a CVs, or be conducted predominantly by air with heavy freight being moved by commercial shipping. The deployment of a task group would allow the UK to retain a capability for military intervention right till the end (providing both command and control and an embarked force) and would be a visible and impressive last UK act in the Territory: for these reasons it is favoured by the Governor. It would however be expensive: no provision has yet been made for a major RN deployment to the Far East in 1997. Departure by air would be cheaper, but would make a
clean break harder to achieve and would entail some
operational risk, with no uncommitted military reserve available. It would also create a much lower profile. From a military point of view there are clear advantages to the
employment of a task group.
At some stage within the next 12-18 months, it will be necessary to establish direct liaison between the Garrison
and the Chinese military authorities to arrange for a
smooth handover of the defence estate in Hong Kong. At the
moment this is handicapped by the fact that there is as yet no agreement on what the defence estate is, and direct
military contact with China is still limited by
restrictions imposed after Tiananmen.
Finance and the Defence Costs Agreement
11. The gross LTC costs of the Hong Kong garrison in the current financial year amount to about £124m. Receipts from the Hong Kong government based on their meeting 65% of the full costs of the garrison in 1992/3 are estimated to be £135m. Withdrawal of one
SECRET UK EYES A