LOOSE MINUTE
D/DD Mar & Hels/77/11 - 0106
29 Jan 93
Hd of Sec(O) (C)
Copy to:
DNO
DMO
D Def Pol
D Prog
D JW/EX
Deputy Press Secretary
Head Of Sec(NS)
Hd of GS (Sec)
Hd of RP(Prog)
SECRET UK EYES A
HKA 063/1
EIVE
ISTRY
03 FEB 1993
DESK CHIC
PA
LCISTRY ction Taken
ik Seate
1/2
??
Hd of GF
FCO(HKD) - Mr Ricketts
HQBF Hong Kong for COS
THE HONG KONG GARRISON WITHDRAWAL PLAN
Reference:
A.
B.
1.
D/Sec(O)(C) 6/7 dated 25 Jan 93
HK/10011 J3 Ops dated 19 Nov 92
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft outline plan for the run down of the Hong Kong garrison at Reference A. I am content with the proposal to maintain the current level of helicopter support (6 AE Wessex plus 2 IURs) throughout the final phase of the withdrawal in order to provide maximum force mobility in the event of an internal disorder. I confirm that there is no pressing need, at the moment, to re deploy these assets elsewhere.
2.
In reviewing the desk level response (Reference B) to the HQBF paper covering the final withdrawal plan, I note that HQBF Hong Kong has decided to pursue the original line to cease Wessex operations on 31 March 1997. While I remain of the opinion that the Wessex Sqn could operate just as effectively "on its feet", during the final 3 months from Sek Kong as the infantry units or disembarked RN aircraft, I accept CRAF's view on this matter. I also have some concern that CBF will be poorly placed if the proposed naval task force, or the associated Sea King SH, were to be diverted elsewhere at a late stage.
3.
I have some difficulty with the logic behind the proposal to disembark naval SH, together with the spares and support equipment whilst the CVS completes her Far East tour and at the same time to embark, and store afloat, Wessex SH, spares and support equipment. I am content that, the naval crews who may not be familiar with the area or the operational environment could be supplemented by RAF crews if the internal security does break down rapidly, but I do not believe there will be
1
SECRET UK EYES A
00
8