SECRET
UK EYES A
into account:
On present planning, the Garrison will reduce to 1 UK battalion (by then found by roulement) at the end of 1996.
a.
b. The Hong Kong Military Service Corps (HKMSC), currently 1000 strong, will be non-effective by the end of 1996, as will the RN LEP (now 300-strong), and few if any LEC will be prepared to remain until the end. They will wish to have made new arrangements for employment elsewhere in Hong Kong or to leave the Territory altogether. It will therefore be necessary to provide some individual reinforcements and service support units to the Garrison to carry out essential tasks during this period.
c.
In the absence of any dialogue with the Chinese on the detailed handover arrangements, we should assume for planning purposes that there will be no provision made for a rear party to remain after the transfer of sovereignty. The arrangements for the final withdrawal will therefore have to take account of the probable need for the Garrison to make a "clean break" on 30 June 1997.
d.
Policy guidance will be needed on the political and public relations profile of the final withdrawal - assuming a benign environment. The bulk of the Garrison's troops are likely to leave Hong Kong by air, while heavy freight is moved by commercial shipping. The deployment of an RN task group would allow the UK to retain a capability for military intervention right until the end (providing both command and control and the option of an embarked force) and would be a visible and impressive last UK act in the Territory: for these reasons it is favoured by the Governor. Planning has already been put in hand to delay the regular RN out of area deployment from 1996 to 1997 to coincide with the withdrawal. Provision has already been included for the additional costs of such deployment as a Cat 0 measure in LTC 93, at a net cost of £3.6M for 1997. The alternative option of total reliance on air and commercial shipping would be cheaper, but would make a clean break harder to achieve and would entail some operational risk, with no uncommitted military reserve available. It would also create a much lower profile. Ministers will need to take a final decision nearer the time, taking into account the detailed financial and operational implications. On the former, we should not rule out seeking a contribution from the Hong Kong Government towards the cost of any RN deployment
e. There will be a need, well before the final handover, for direct contact between the Garrison and the PLA in order to facilitate a smooth transition. At the moment this is inhibited by the lack of progress on defence lands in the Joint Liaison Group and the continuing prohibition on senior military contact in the aftermath of Tiananmen.
COSSEC/S/2.004
4
UK EYES A SECRET