5. SPENDING ON THE GARRISON IN THE 1992/93 FINANCIAL YEAR HAS EXCEEDED THE BUDGETARY PROVISION APPROVED BY LEGCO. IN PART THIS
WA DUE TO UNDER-ESTIMATES BY THE GARRISON. BUT WE HAVE ALSO QUOTED A NUMBER OF ITEMS IN THE 4TH QUARTER ACCOUNTS PRESENTED TO US. IF SATISFACTORY ANSWERS ARE RECEIVED WE WILL PAY UP. BUT GIVEN THE TIME CONSTRAINTS THIS WILL MOST LIKELY BE IN APRIL, WHEN ANY JUSTIFIED BALANCE WILL BE MET FROM NEXT YEAR'S APPROPRIATIONS. I HAVE EXPLAINED THE POSITION TO SIR CHRISTOPHER FRANCE.
6.
MOD HAVE POINTED TO OUR FAVOURABLE BUDGET AND RESERVE SITUATION. THEY HAVE ASKED WHY WE COULD NOT CONVINCE LEGCO OF THE NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDS. THE REASONS, WHICH APPLY NOT JUST THIS YEAR BUT WILL APPLY INCREASINGLY BETWEEN NOW AND 1997, ARE AS FOLLOWS:
(A) OTHER THAN AT SEA, THE GENERAL PERCEPTION IS THAT THE GARRISON NOW DOES VERY LITTLE FOR HONG KONG. WE USED THE ARGUMENT WITH LEGCO, WHEN THE POLICE AND AUXILIARY AIRFORCE WERE BEING EXPANDED TO TAKE OVER ON THE BORDER, THAT THE GARRISON WOULD BE ABLE TO SHRINK. LEGCO MEMBERS NOW EXPECT IT TO.
(B) AS HONG KONG PREPARES FOR ITS NEW SOVEREIGN, SPENDING ON FORCES WHICH MANY NATURALLY EQUATE WITH DEFENCE AGAINST CHINA IS NOT GOING TO WIN SYMPATHETIC HEARING.
(C) AFTER 1997, CHINA HAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE JOINT DECLARATION TO PAY FOR ALL MILITARY FORCES WHICH IT SENDS TO HONG KONG. HONG KONG WILL MAKE NO CONTRIBUTION. CONTRASTS WITH THE PRE-1997 SITUATION ARE INEVITABLY MADE.
(D) UNLIKE AT WESTMINSTER WE HAVE NO GOVERNMENT PARTY AND NO DEFENCE LOBBY. WE HAVE THREE OFFICIAL VOTES AND WE WILL LOSE THEM IN 1995. THE RISK IF WE HAD GONE TO LEGCO FOR ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS THIS YEAR WAS NOT SIMPLY THAT THE REQUEST WOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED. RATHER IT WAS THAT THE ENTIRE DEFENCE COSTS AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION.
7. MY CONCLUSION FROM THIS EPISODE IS THAT THE DEFENCE COSTS BUDGET FOR 1993/94 MUST NOT ONLY COVER ANY JUSTIFIED OVERSPENDING IN 1992/93, BUT WITH THAT INCLUDED MUST IF AT ALL POSSIBLE
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DECLINE IN REAL TERMS. IN EACH SUBSEQUENT YEAR THERE MUST ALSO BE A REAL DECLINE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH I SUGGEST NEED TO BE EXAMINED IMMEDIATELY BY MOD, IF NECESSARY BEFORE THE REVIEW TAKES PLACE:
(A) AT PRESENT WE ARE EXCLUDED ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRAWING UP OF HONG KONG'S DEFENCE ESTIMATES. WE ARE SIMPLY PRESENTED WITH THE BILL AND ASKED TO PAY 65 PERCENT. IT IS NOT TOO MUCH TO SAY THAT ALTHOUGH WE PAY TWO- THIRDS OF THE PIPER'S SALARY, WE HARDLY HAVE A SIGHT OF HIS SCORE. THIS MUST CHANGE. WE ARE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH HQBF ON THIS AND SIR CHRISTOPHER FRANCE ACCEPTED, WHEN I MET HIM ON 23 FEBRUARY, THAT THE MOD NEEDED TO PROVIDE US WITH FAR MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE SCALE OF THE GARRISON'S ACTIVITIES AND DETAILS OF ITS FUNDING. WE WILL BE PUTTING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO MOD FOR MORE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE MOD AND HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO FOLLOW UP SIR CHRISTOPHER FRANCE'S PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS.
(B) THE NEED FOR THIS IS HIGHLIGHTED BY TWO EXAMPLES. YEAR THERE WERE 700 OFFICIAL MOD VISITS TO HONG KONG. THIS COMPARES WITH ABOUT 100 FROM ALL OTHER BRITISH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS PUT TOGETHER. WE HAVE ALSO JUST FOUND OUT THAT HQBF HAVE ORDERED 168 NEW CARS FOR THE GARRISON. WE HAVE ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT BOTH THESE POINTS BEFORE WE PAY THE 4TH QUARTER
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