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such a move would create ill feeling amongst the Hong Kong
public, fuel arguments that this was a step by the UK to
withdraw from her responsibilities over BDTCs and BN (0) s
well before 1997 and in fact make them second class
citizens. We agreed in May 1991 with the Hong Kong
Government that these reasons were still valid. We also
agreed that HKID's pivotal role in the BNHKA Selection
Scheme was a further strong reason to delay the transfer
until the second tranche of the nationality scheme is
completed. We concluded that HKID should retain, until very
close to 1997, responsibility for all passport work and for
all "consular"/protection work. (BDTC and BN (0)
registration will cease in 1997, though passport renewal for
BN (0)s will continue).
7.
We do however see a particular case for assuming
responsibility for visa work well before 1997. In practical
terms this would enable staff of the BTC to iron out
teething problems to ensure as smooth a transition as
possible. There are also security considerations. It would be desirable for UK staff to be in a position to exercise
control over entry clearances at what could be a politically sensitive time in Hong Kong, when there could be political
pressures on HKID staff. It would also be preferable to
control access to our more sensitive documents, such as the
Visa Warning List and the Special Visa Directive, which we
would not like to see fall into Chinese hands. The
assumption of responsibilities previously carried out by
HKID may mean that they will require less staff. If so we should certainly look at offering experienced locally engaged staff positions, on a selective basis; (although we
have explained to HKID, and they have accepted, that the
more senior posts of Entry Clearance Officers will have to
be filled by UK based staff).
8. The immigration section would be rather less labour
intensive than passport section, requiring some 16 UK based
and 32 locally engaged staff members, as distinct from 4 UK
JM1ACK/3
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