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course.
M Boidevaix said that France generally shared our perceptions. There were internal conflicts in Iran; Rafsanjani's policy of economic development might re-establish more rational values. During his visit to Iran, M Boidevaix had learned of plans to establish monetary stability within 18 months; at the same time however, Rafsanjani continued to buy armaments, and was being pressed for immediate action, eg on Abu Musa, by the hardliners in the Majlis led by Khamenei.
Instead of the
11. M Boidevaix went on; Iran was dangerous. Rushdie affair France had to contend with the Iranian-approved murder of Bahktiar. Majid Sailis was one of those wanted for questioning. (Sailis is currently in UK, and is the subject of an extradition enquiry by France.) The PUS suggested that further dialogue would be useful. We were worried that the Japanese and others were unhelpfully giving credits to Iran. He suggested that Mr Gore-Booth discuss this with the Quai in greater detail. M Boidevaix welcomed this, and proposed talks with the new Sous-Director, Jean-Pierre Guinhut, who had
first-hand experience of Iran.
Bilateral Issues
12.
M Boidevaix noted that the Joint Heads of Mission Conference would now slip into 1993. Although Central Asia was an interesting topic, the Balkans may be more relevant. He accepted that there might be operational problems. The PUS picked up this point. Events might make it difficult to bring back Ambassadors from Posts in the region; an alternative topic might be the former Soviet Union, in the context of Yeltsin's reforms. He would get in touch with Boidevaix in
the New Year.
13.
Ambassador Dorin raised the outstanding Franco-British Summit, stressing the need to find suitable dates early in 1993. The PUS regretted the Prime Minister's and President's
diary problems this autumn; he hoped that we would be able to arrange something after the Edinburgh Summit.
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