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French hoped that agreement on arrangements could be reached at present formal proposals to the North Atlantic Council on 17 December, although the timing might be tight. M Boidevaix said that the Bonn Summit had authorised the NATO
Secretary-General to take discussions forward between SACEUR
and the Franco-German Corps. He and the PUS welcomed the real prospect of a solution which would satisfy NATO partners.
8.
The PUS said that French views on peacekeeping would be
valuable. Our experience in former Yugoslavia suggested that
adequate command and control procedures there could only be
instituted by transplanting a NATO structure. NATO members
could learn much from the French experience of peacekeeping. M Boidevaix agreed, and gave an example of difficulties French
forces had faced in the Balkans through contradictory UN
instructions. Happily the US Sixth Fleet and French AWACS had
been able to co-operate, but the real need was for UN effectiveness on the ground. Some peacekeeping forces were simply not good enough. The PUS agreed. Serbian plans for the virtual annexation of areas of Bosnia were now becoming
clearer; there were worries that France and UK would become
extensively committed.
9.
M Boidevaix raised the question of the Anglo-French frigate. He hoped that this project would flourish.
Ambassador Dorin raised a small problem; M Joxe wanted to sign the preliminary agreement but understood that Mr Rifkind
was reticent. The PUS said that, according to our brief, the
agreement would be signed by Ministers. We would check.
Middle East
It was
10. The PUS reported continuing problems with Iran. false to portray Rafsanjani's administration as "moderate". Iran had not yet renounced terrorism, and was continuing its intelligence activities. Rafsanjani had simply brought greater discipline to Iran's operations. The PUS handed over
a background brief and invited the French to comment in due
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