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impact on the parliamentary and public debate next year. agreement was reached on the main issues, this would prove that the entire process was coming together, and show that opponents of Maastricht were in isolation. M Boidevaix asked if the negative EEA vote in Switzerland would have an impact.
The PUS discounted this despite UK press speculation. M Boidevaix regretted similar problems with the press in
France.
3.
M Boidevaix raised the importance of EC financing. The
PUS said that many partners, including the UK, France and Germany, had taken tough decisions on public expenditure.
Domestic opinion would not understand how resources could be vastly increased for cohesion funds. A compromise on the
lines of the Presidency proposals should be possible. This
would virtually double cash available for cohesion, and remove
objections to enlargement. M Boidevaix said that President
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl were agreed on enlargement, as
a route to Europen Union. The PUS said that there should be
no misunderstanding. We wanted an early start to negotiations on enlargement but accepted that the EFTANS could not choose the EC à la carte. Applications to join would be based on the
acquis and Maastricht. M Boidevaix said that France, unlike
Germany, understood Spanish demands for cohesion funds.
would eventually, accept a compromise. Ambassador Dorin mentioned the UK abatement; Sir Leon Brittan's suggestion
which gave Spain an increase in funding without reducing the
UK abatement was an effective trade-off. Perhaps the recent
Swiss vote to reject the EEA would dispel unrealistic
expectations for an increase in cohesion funds, given that
Switzerland would have become a net contributor.
Spain
4. The PUS turned to the question of sites of EC
institutions; the UK undestood French concerns about Strasbourg. The key issue was the location of the European Bank. There were competing claims from several cities, but a
fairly widespread reluctance to accept Frankfurt. M Boidevaix
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