Bridge, at p. 531E to G, and Lord Templeman at pp. 537F to 538B.
This approach places a "special responsibility" on the court
where a "flawed decision may imperil life or liberty". This
"special responsibility" requires the court to subject the
decision and decision-making process to "most anxious scrutiny"
However, Mr. Thomas submitted that the result of this approach
is
to reverse the normal onus of proof on an application for
judicial review, so that it is for the Home Secretary to justify
his decision and not for the applicant to show his decision is
flawed. This, in my judgment, is to overstate the position. In
a case such as this where it is, correctly, not suggested that
the Home Secretary is required to give a reasoned decision, an
applicant cannot succeed by saying that the onus of proof is on
the Home Secretary.
Nonetheless, the manner in which the
practice on applications for judicial review has developed over
the years means that in cases of this nature the court can expect
the respondent to file an affidavit which will disclose the basis
upon which the decision was taken. Possibly, as was suggested
by Miss Montgomery on behalf of the Home Secretary, because the
8