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MDLIAN 3815
4. IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT WE MUST AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD SUGGEST COLLUSION BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ANY OF THE MALAYSIANS INVOLVED IN THIS VERY MURKY CASE, THOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT GHAZALI HIMSELF WAS EVER DIRECTLY INVOLVED OTHER THAN AS A VOICE FOR THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT.
5.
THAT SAID, IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE IN OUR INTERESTS FOR GHAZALI, IF SUBPOENA'D (AND IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT WILL HAPPEN), TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH DAVIES WHICH WAS SUBSTANTIALLY INACCURATE, NOT LEAST IF A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM IS IN OSMAN'S HANDS.
ACCORDINGLY, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:
6.
(A) WE SHOULD TELL GHAZALI THAT WE CANNOT LET HIM HAVE SIGHT OF THE TELEGRAM. THIS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WHICH IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT OSMAN QUITE IMPROPERLY - MIGHT HAVE HAD ACCESS TO THE TEXT, (B) HOWEVER, IF GHAZALI WERE SUBPOENA'D, BUT ONLY IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD ENSURE THAT HE WAS GIVEN SIGHT OF AN ACCURATE SUMMARY OF THE HIGH COMMISSION'S REPORT OF THE MEETING ON 15 AUGUST 1983.
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