-3-
6.
But
All this despite the shadow of 1997. that shadow remains. In many ways it is deepening. In 1979, when we first raised seriously with the Chinese the issue of what to do about the end of the New Territories lease (covering over 90% of the territory), it was hoped that some way could be found to obscure the effect of what the Chinese always referred to as the "unequal treaties" of the nineteenth century. If the Chinese did not recognise the treaties, and if the status quo suited everybody, including the Chinese who gained at least a third of their foreign exchange earning from the territory, then surely a way could be found of obscuring the fateful date by extending land leases in a way which reassured investors without damaging China's national pride. The hope proved to be vain. Unequal treaty or not, it became clear that, for the Chinese as much as anybody else, 1997 was a date fixed irrevocably in the calendar. When negotiations started in earnest in 1982, the hope of continuing British administration under Chinese sovereignty an arrangement which would have met the wishes of the vast majority of Hong Kong's population proved vain as well. China was determined that the legacy of its nineteenth century weakness in the face of the imperial powers should disappear before the end of the twentieth century. National pride was at stake.
1.
In the circumstances, the Joint Declaration signed in December 1984 was a remarkable achievement. Britain had been dealt an appallingly difficult hand of cards by the arrangements made in 1898 for a 99-year lease (one reason for which was to prevent the Russians demanding further ceded territory in the North). It contained no trumps and precious few court cards, except the damage that could be done to Chinese economic interests, and their hope for the reintegration of Taiwan, by a collapse of Hong Kong. Despite this, the arrangements that have been written down for the policies China will adopt towards Hong Kong for 50 years beyond 1997 cover most, but not all, of what we were trying to achieve and are certainly as good as could reasonably be expected. The constant question of the critics, and many others, is not whether the content of the Joint Declaration is as good as it could be but whether the provisions of the agreement will really work. The honest answer is that it is impossible to know in advance. this must be added the rider that we must do everything we can to ensure that they do.
ΤΟ