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had some affect in limited areas but that it was unrealistic to expect major change until there were wider
changes in the political structure in China. They had expressed some doubts about some of the EC's tactics eg
the use of lists. They thought that the best approach
was to focus on areas of excessive abuse of human rights in areas where the leadership could respond to pressure but without endangering the basis of their power. Some such areas might be the high number of detainees,
harshness of prison sentences etc. We were to send a human rights delegation to China, led by Sir Geoffrey Howe, later in the year. Providing an opportunity for experienced observers to engage the Chinese on issues in this way might be productive.
12.
Herr Schlaginweit said that German public and parliament tended to see China largely through the human
rights perspective. Economic interest was far smaller.
But we had to accept that human rights problems were likely to be a feature of China for a long time. He
strongly agreed that lists of cases had limited value. The German government was also planning to send a representative to China to discuss human rights. There was also some thought of forming expert China / German
groups to discuss human rights issues in a sober and factual way. He agreed that it would be best to
concentrate EC action on areas of particular concern and
where there was some chance of representations having an
effect; and that we should keep in touch about the two human rights delegations: there might be some value in leaders of the two delegations meeting.
13. Herr Schlaginweit said that there was a very active Tibet lobby in Germany, but he saw little prospect for
positive developments in Tibet. He wondered if the
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