CONFIDENTIAL
051203
MDTTAN 1512
LIAISON PEOPLE WHO WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED BE TO DEAL WITH SUCH
VISITS. WOULD THEY BE PART OF THE DEFENCE ATTACHE COMPLEMENT OF
THE EMBASSY ?
THESE WERE JUST EXAMPLES. THERE WERE PLENTY OF OTHER QUESTIONS
WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERED. BUT THE MAINTENANCE OF HONG KONG'S HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY UNDER THE JOINT DECLARATION WAS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL OBJECTIVE FOR THE US. THAT, AND THE WEIGHT OF US ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL US PRESENCE IN HONG KONG POST-1997.
3.
ROY SAID THAT IN HIS OWN CONSIDERATION OF THESE AND SIMILAR
QUESTIONS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF PRESENCE THE UK
INTENDED TO MAINTAIN IN HONG KONG AFTER 1997. DID WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE AND ACTIVE INTEREST OR WAS IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD WISH TO WASH ITS HANDS OF HONG KONG ONCE
THE TERRITORY HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY ? I SAID
THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF HMG WASHING ITS HANDS OF HONG KONG. WE WOULD MAINTAIN A STRONG AND ACTIVE INTEREST AND WE WERE PLANNING
FOR A SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH PRESENCE AFTER 1997. THE NUMBER OF BODIES WAS NOT EASY TO DETERMINE AT THIS STAGE: THE IMMIGRATION COMPONENT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, DEPEND ON THE TAKE UP OF BN (0) PASSPORTS BY 1997. BUT MINISTERS HAD DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A SEPARATE, PURPOSE-BUILT CONSULATE BUILDING AND WE HAD ALREADY OBTAINED LAND FOR IT IN THE MID-LEVELS FROM THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT. THE CONSULATE GENERAL WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO BE FORMALLY SUBORDINATE TO THE AMBASSADOR IN PEKING. BUT IN PRACTICE IT WOULD BE A LARGELY INDEPENDENT COMMAND.
4.
I SAID I WAS SURE THAT THE HONG KONG INTEREST LAY IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL US PRESENCE IN THE TERRITORY AFTER
1997: ANY MARKED REDUCTION IN STAFFING OR FUNCTIONS WOULD HAVE AN
ADVERSE AFFECT ON CONFIDENCE. WHILE THERE MIGHT BE SOME TYPES OF ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE STOPPED OR CURTAILED, THE PRESUMPTION SHOULD BE THAT MOST COULD CONTINUE. THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE WELL ADVISED TO AVOID PUTTING AWKWARD QUESTIONS TO THE CHINESE (EG ON THE PRECISE STATUS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL DEALING
WITH SHIP VISITS) UNLESS IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO DO SO.
5.
STAPLETON ROY TAKES A CLOSE, AND I THINK SYMPATHETIC INTEREST IN HONG KONG AND HIS ADVICE ON POST-1997 PLANNING IS LIKELY TO BE
ON HELPFUL LINES. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHETHER YOU OR COPY ADDRESSEES HAVE HEARD ANY ECHOES OF THE KIND OF INTER-AGENCY DEBATE TO WHICH ROY REFERRED. BUT I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HIS
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