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us to make. The problem with a statement is of course that it would alienate Congress and invite charges of kow-towing
in Hong Kong and here.
4.
6
Washington telno 275 reports that it is difficult to predict whether, or when, the Bill will become law. But they warn of the damage that would be done by a public
done by statement. Hong Kong agrees (HK telno 346) as does Peking
8 (Peking telno 169) who doubt whether the Chinese
really expect to persuade us to speak out and further advise that such damage would outweigh any irritation we may cause
the Chinese by not speaking out. All are agreed that we
should avoid lobbying on the Hill but should quietly let the
Administration know of the points which concern us in the
Bill; the main bugbear is the reporting requirement, the
Administration are already aware of our concern and plan to try to persuade McConnell to amend the Bill.
5.
Washington recommends a sensible holding line for the Minister to use with Ambassador Ma. The checklist provided
by FED reflects this line. Peking's telegram (which arrived
after FED's briefing had been finalised) endorses the line
and suggests that Lord Caithness also ask what the Chinese
Embassy in Washington have been reporting on the issue and
whether the Embassy have sought to put their views directly
to Senator McConnell. I agree that these are points worth making though I am not sure that we shall get very far, with
them.
<delty
PF Ricketts
JM1ABN/2
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