CONFIDENTIAL
HKD 021 12
104223
MDHOAN 9526 ·
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO 157 ·
OF 111135Z FEBRUARY 92
ZB
INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG, UKREP JLG HONG KONG INFO PRIORITY BTC HONG KONG, PEKING, ACTOR
6
7
346
TOP COPY COST?
√ 17/2
Euter
YOUR TELNO 275, HONG KONG TELNO 346 AND PEKING TELNO 169: HONG KONG POLICY ACT 1991 (THE MCCONNELL BILL)
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1 AT HIS MEETING WITH LORD CAITHNESS ON 10 FEBRUARY, AMBASSADOR MA SPOKE AS EXPECTED ABOUT THE MCCONNELL BILL, IMPLYING THAT IF BRITAIN DID NOT LOBBY AGAINST THE BILL THIS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS CONNIVING AT THE INTERNATIONALISATION'
OF HONG KONG. LORD CAITHNESS RESPONDED ON THE LINES RECOMMENDED
IN PARA 6 OF FIRST TUR.
2 =
WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH YOU, PEKING AND HONG KONG THAT THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF A CRITICAL PUBLIC STATEMENT IS LIKELY TO OUTWEIGH ANY BENEFITS IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA. BUT A DECISION ON HOW TO RESPOND PUBLICLY CAN BE HELD UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE TEXT EMERGES FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S TALKS WITH MCCONNELL (AND POSSIBLY UNTIL WE SEE WHETHER THE BILL IS GOING TO PASS.)
3. WE AGREE WE SHOULD ALSO AVOID AN ACTIVE LOBBYING CAMPAIGN ON THE HILL BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF ALIENATING ALLIES ON OTHER SUBJECTS, EG MFN. BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO RUN THE RISK OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND POTENTIALLY SYMPATHETIC OR WELL-DISPOSED CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING OUR CONCERNS. GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF YOU COULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE A CLEAR AND DETAILED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION. IN ADDITION, WITHOUT WAITING TO SEE HOW THE ADMINISTRATION GET ON IN THEIR TALKS WITH MCCONNELL, PLEASE MAKE THE SORT OF DISCREET APPROACHES TO TRUSTED CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS TO WHICH YOU REFER IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF FIRST TUR. THE KEY ARGUMENTS ARE THOSE IN OUR TELNO 1733 OF 18 OCTOBER 1991 AND MOAKES' FAX TO PATTISON OF 15 NOVEMBER 1991, IN PARTICULAR THOSE DEALING WITH THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, CLARIFICATION OF WHETHER THE BILL IS TO DEAL WITH POST-1997 ONLY, CLARIFICATION OF HONG KONG'S EXISTING AUTONOMY (IE PRE-AS WELL AS POST-1997), AND UNHELPFUL SUGGESTIONS - IN EG 101(4) AND
Jak
104(7) AND (8) THAT THE US SHOULD WAIT UNTIL 1997 BEFORE CONCLUDING
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CONFIDENTIAL